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The Est-hetics of Esthetics: Pedagogy as a Science of Life
Giuseppe Tognon1
[…] the artist descends within himself, and in that lonely region of stress and strife, 
if he be deserving and fortunate, he finds the terms of his appeal […] the artist 
appeals to that part of our being which is not dependent on wisdom; to that in us 
which is a gift and not an acquisition—and, therefore, more permanently enduring. 
He speaks to our capacity for delight and wonder, to the sense of mystery surroun-
ding our lives; to our sense of pity, and beauty, and pain; to the latent feeling of fel-
lowship with all creation—and to the subtle but invincible conviction of solidarity 
that knits together the loneliness of innumerable hearts, to the solidarity in dreams, 
in joy, in sorrow, in aspirations, in illusions, in hope, in fear, which binds men to 
each other, which binds together all humanity—the dead to the living and the living 
to the unborn.
Joseph Conrad, Preface to The Nigger of the Narcissus (1914)
I. The disciplinary boundaries of esthetics are rather imprecise, but for 
exactly this reason esthetic theory has become increasingly relevant to Phi-
losophy and Pedagogy. After decades of debate about what a work of art is 
or should be, we have realised that we cannot define the esthetic dimension 
of human life solely by reference to art objects, particularly when they have 
lost their significance. But, at the same time, the new forms of multimedia art 
have to defend themselves from those who still insist on looking for content in 
form and do not understand that the esthetic experience goes beyond any ma-
terial object or representation2. Contemporary man has shifted his attention 
from esthetic ideologies, which made a utilitarian use of objects and theories, 
to the psychological and philosophical dimension of the relationship between 
man and his world, which embraces a multitude of forms. 
Within this fluid scenario, we cannot however become prisoners of that 
transformation, which took place during the course of the 18th century, when 
the ancient philosophy of beauty turned into an even more banal philosophy 
of taste3. A vast anthropological change has influenced the human being, who 
– at last – is no longer considered as the demiurge who fashioned the world or 
as an Absolute capable of transcendent thought, but – more modestly  – a li-
1  Giuseppe Tognon is a full Professor of Philosophy and History of Education at LUMSA 
University in Rome. He was awarded an undergraduate degree (Laurea) in Philosophy and a 
Ph.D.  in Philosophy at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa. He has carried out research in 
France and Germany and taught in Venice, Pisa, Rome and Paris. He has been Coordinator 
for the PhD programme in Education at LUMSA University since 2007. 
2  Cfr. P. Sorlain, Esthétiques de l’audiovisuel, Paris, Nathan, 1992. 
3  Aesthetics (from the Greek aisthetikos, or “perceptual”) was first used in 1750 to designate a 
theory of “sensuous cognition” by the German philosopher  Alexander Baumgarten.
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ving being in which biology and symbolism are always in  a precarious balan-
ce. Neurosciences oblige Esthetics and Pedagogy (disciplines which overlap) 
to take a reductionist approach to “nature”, which, allowing for the limitations 
of all reductionism, nevertheless has the merit of emphasising the ideological 
and evolutionary nature of every cultural perspective, and provides an oppor-
tunity to shape philosophical and scientific ideas into new forms4. 
In his influential work written in 1934, Art as Experience, John Dewey ex-
plains that experience, defined as interaction between organisms and their 
environment, really finds its highest expression in Art. He explains that the 
esthetic experience is an “everyday” experience fundamental to human. In 
art the individual experiences to the fullest the fluidity of human existence, 
which cannot be understood solely through the psyche or through logic.  Edu-
cation in the arts thus becomes a guiding principle which encompasses the 
whole of human life. The unity of man cannot exist outside experience, which 
cannot be reduced to a series of isolated phenomena or facts, and needs an in-
spirational motor, to replace the old model of a Subject attempting to control 
it. Even the most important educator of the 20th century, Maria Montessori, 
understood immediately that a child’s development is determined by the use 
of his body in space and time “on a child scale” and that “the key to the world” 
does not lie in spoken words, but rather in the physical and psychological as-
similation of those things which nourish the senses of us all: shapes, colours, 
smells, sounds, temperature and weight...5. In fact, life is not only physical 
existence, but consists of thought and so education in the arts helps us to un-
derstand that educating  is a complex and delicate  undertaking  which repro-
duces at every stage the effects of play, and stimulates those processes  vital for 
the preservation of personal identity. 
II. In a recent work on the philosophy of educating6, I attempted to demon-
strate that it is possible to return to pedagogical considerations too much edu-
cating in all forms of education and that, starting from the great theme of the 
metamorphosis of forms7 (which affected so much of the culture of the 18th 
and the 19th centuries) it is possible to heal the fracture between content and 
representation, and between life and values. Rupert Riedl, in Der Verlust der 
Morphologie, published posthumously in 2006, spoke of a dramatic “loss of 
4  Cfr. F. Desideri- C. Cantelli, Storia dell’estetica occidentale. Da Omero alle neuroscienze, 
Roma, Carocci, 2014; F. Vercellone, A. Bertinetto, G. Garelli, Storia dell’estetica moderna e 
contemporanea, Bologna, il Mulino, 2003.
5  M. Montessori, Il metodo della pedagogia scientifica applicato all’educazione infantile nelle 
case dei bambini, P. Trabalzini ed., Roma, Opera nazionale Montessori, 2000.
6  G. Tognon, Est-etica. Filosofia dell’educare, Brescia, La Scuola, 2014.
7  A. Pinotti-S. Tedesco (eds.), Estetica e scienze della vita, Milano, R. Cortina editore, 2014; 
F. Desideri, La percezione riflessa. Estetica e filosofia della mente, Milano, R. Cortina editore, 
2011; Evolutionary Aesthetics, ed. by E. Voland and K. Grammer, London, Springer-Verlag, 
2003.
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morphology” leading to the inability of contemporary culture to make sense 
of the world8. The space vacated by forms is not empty, but it is available for 
new ideas and, above all, it opens the way for a reconsideration of many of the 
observations and experiences, already described in the history of ideas, which 
have been marginalised for so long. From this perspective, there is also room 
to reconsider the philosophy of pedagogy, taking it beyond past views domi-
nated by the notion of “ought” (sollen) that Kant took as the foundation of his 
anthropology9. Man, the German philosopher writes, is «constantly assailed 
by animal impulses and tempted to contravene the laws of morality thus fal-
ling from that level of perfection which he has already reached»10. Only if he is 
subject to the laws of discipline will a man understand how to achieve his true 
nature11. The goal of education is to straighten the ‘warped wood of humanity’ 
12. According to the modern theory of education, anthropological discourse 
and philosophical discourse were closely bound together for reasons of moral 
rather than natural necessity because they had both absorbed, in a religious or 
anti-religious fashion, the Renaissance idea that man can only realise his full 
potential if he overcomes the “fault” of moral ambiguity; of being capable of 
great good and also of great evil. «This problem», Kant writes, «is therefore the 
most difficult of all, and a perfect solution is not possible. From the warped 
wood of which a human being is made nothing wholly true can be fashioned»13.
Educating raises fundamental questions for contemporary man. Should 
education be considered as his defining characteristic – his mission in life – or 
should it be seen only as a process of factual enquiry, a necessity for survival? 
Is educating a fundamental human need or is it, as we know it, simply a so-
cial convention? Is it still possible through the development of an individual s` 
virtues, to determine the ethical behaviour of humankind as a whole, or is it 
necessary to work on more potent forms of expression, beauty and love, which 
are the characteristic products of human evolution? In our daily lives must 
8  R. Riedl, Der Verlust der Morphologie, Wien, Seifert Verlag, 2006.
9  In order to keep my distance from the usual rhetoric about the crisis in education, I 
avoid equating educating with education, just like man cannot be reduced to an anatomical 
description of his body. I am choosing, in line with the model offered by the Ancient Greek 
language, to use a verbal noun, educating, to denote the continuity of a profound human 
inclination which is the same for us all although it does not develop in the same way. 
Just as in grammar the verb is distinct from the subject and the object, supporting them 
without «concerning itself» with content, so the experience of educating is distinct from the 
expression of its outcomes, and concerns itself with what it is, and not why.  
10 Cfr. I. Kant, In che cosa consiste il progresso del genere umano verso il meglio?, in ID., Scritti 
politici e di filosofia della storia e del diritto, It. transl. G. Solari - G. Vidari,  Torino, Utet, 
1956, p. 232.
11  I. Kant, La Pedagogia, It. transl. Rubitschek, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1975, p. 4.
12  Cfr. I. Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity. Chapters in the History of Ideas, Pimlico, 
London 2003; It. transl.  Il legno storto dell’umanità, Milano, Adelphi, 1994.
13 Cfr. I. Kant, Idea di una storia universale dal punto di vista cosmopolitico, in ID., Scritti 




we remain attached to the meanings of those things which have a conventio-
nal force based on habit and the need for a sense of security, or is it perhaps 
necessary to develop an active approach which breaks through the entropy of 
conventional social theory and aims at grasping the sense of what it means 
to be human in the complex mixture of biology and symbolism which is life? 
The Est-hetics of educating is not therefore a new “special field” in philo-
sophy, but an attempt to move away from the pedagogic experience towards 
a philosophy of experience that surpasses the limitations of a paideia entirely 
centred on the tenet of what man ought to be. The study of the concept of be-
auty, from the kalokagatia of the ancient Greeks, through the Enlightenment 
of 18th century, to the crisis of esthetic formalism in the 20th century, help us 
to understand that, to make pedagogy  a science of life, it is necessary to move 
away from the disconnect between form and content and think again about 
the dialectic between  critical thinking and that awareness of reality which is 
as much a  part of our daily life as  breathing. 
The question of the significance of experience was much debated by phi-
losophers in the 19th century, who sought to complete the biological concept 
of morphology which had emerged in the 18th century and was developed by 
various thinkers, primarily Goethe. He rejects the separation of esthesis (per-
ception) and noesis (the activity of the mind) and maintains that morphology 
is not intended to explain, erklären, but merely to present, darstellen, in such 
a way that its significance is revealed. In the 20th century, Arnold Gehlen and 
other anthropologists attempt to explain typically human phenomena, such 
as language and morality, as cultural responses to early contact with the na-
tural world. Man is not a specialised being, but to the contrary, he specialises 
after birth. Jacob von Uexküll elaborates in an exhaustive manner the theori-
es of an “environment-world” (Umwelt) and of man’s fundamental openness 
to the natural world (Weltoffenheit). Sensory and motor organs are the twin 
pillars of animal life and form a closed unit, a living sphere which encapsula-
tes the interaction between perception and action. For Uexküll, every animal 
forever carries its environment within it, but only man is truly open to the 
world, to all objects and not only to those which are biologically necessary for 
survival. His is really a true Welt. Max Scheler, following Hegel, sees man as 
“a window onto the Absolute” and considers his capacity for spirituality as his 
defining characteristic.
The claim of anthropological philosophy to construct an objective human 
identity was criticised by Heidegger and by hermeneutic philosophy which 
seeks to emphasise the subjective element. Moreover, the theory of pedagogy 
takes a step beyond that attempted by the approach of anthropological philo-
sophy. A morphology of educating cannot content itself either with the idea 
of moral laws nor with the laws of nature which govern animals. So what and 
how many forms may education take? Every man is a unique being and hence 
no single principle will ever suffice to convey the experience of life. It is not a 
question of producing a set of binding rules, but - rather - of presenting, de-
scribing, accompanying the life of each individual.
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III. Educating requires the sensitive application of theory and practice. At 
the root of the crisis in the philosophy of education lies, in fact, a pedagogical 
prejudice based on a dogmatic, abstract theory of ethics. Today it is possible to 
counter-balance the binary oppositions elaborated by modern philosophy (e.g. 
mind/body, materialism/spirituality, nature/culture…) with an educational 
strategy that works around the dynamic of love and time, of internal fulfil-
ment and external space. If we consider education not only as a social necessity, 
but as the only complete way of life, then we will be able to try and recreate a 
morphology of education in which beauty and esthetics accomplish an essen-
tial task:  the realisation of goodness in beauty. Certainly, the morphology of 
educating is not a solution to the problems of humanity, but it is a flexible in-
terpretative tool which keeps open a useful scientific pluralism. The est-hetical 
perspective is designed to take account of the complexity of the experience of 
life, putting it beyond the purely material, but without detracting from that 
biological sensibility which unites all the various aspects of life, and that has 
in beauty a powerful expressive tool. Hence, est-hetics may be defined as an 
ethical system which aspires to be (est) comprehensive and complete.
This perspective differs from the dominant tendency in modern anthropo-
logy to place bodies and ideas at the centre of distinct or replica worlds, so that 
the natural is as if it were a reproduction and, conversely, the artificial is as if it 
were natural. The secular attempt to separate body and mind, sensibility and 
rationality, emotions and ideas, has increased the distance of the individual 
from that personal dimension that does not lie in the physical universe, but 
in intimacy, in his own inner space, where absolute subjectivity or objective 
abstract alterity are of no consequence with respect to the familiarity and the 
warmth of being, and of the body.
Unfortunately, common sense resists the attempt to establish a new est-
hetic pedagogy. Talking of beauty when discussing education is still perceived 
as strange, counter-intuitive. It is said, for example, that many individuals do 
not possess any esthetic sense and yet they are principled and perfectly able 
to carry out their work. Beauty can be taught, just as we can be taught how to 
control our emotions, but we are generally led to believe that esthetic educa-
tion has little to do with ethics, which is considered  far  more exacting and 
demanding; a system (of values and  actions and the means by which to give 
effect to them) to strive against human weakness. In fact, an ethical system 
unsupported by beauty, is less effective. It is not possible to see moral values 
for what they are, a human creation, without having in some way understood 
that they are not separate, but correspond in a way that  compels us to seek 
perfection in objects and in nature, in a way beyond normal sensory percep-
tion, and inexplicable simply as sensation. What we perceive as the intrinsic 
beauty of things, or words, originates from a multitude of examples to which 
we are witness, and which tell us that someone has already felt what we feel 
ourselves. The cacophony of words which come out of our mouths is a repe-
tition going far back into the past, and the act of remembering this generates 
the esthetic pleasure of certainty. Educating consists in teaching how to repeat 
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the same gestures, until they slowly approach the perfection of an «acquired 
naturalness», resulting in pleasure that not only excites the mind, but also the 
senses. The rhythm of the voice, the precision of the gesture, the timing  of 
the surprise, the unfolding landscape of visual perception, sounds interrupted 
even by silence14, lead to an  “educational condensation” which is metonymic: 
the author is replaced by the  work, cause by effect, content by  container, con-
crete by  abstract, and all effortlessly.
Although personal and societal morality are always dynamic, yet is no-
teworthy that in the field of Education Sciences, we struggle to find space for 
the metonymy which results from the productive exchange between ethics 
and esthetics. They survive as applied ethics or deontology, dependent on the 
skill of the teacher and the professionalism of the pedagogue, or as applied 
esthetics, the study of the theory of perception and creativity, or in the search 
for a harmonious environment. Once we put the spontaneity of the individual 
to one side, and the claim of our cultural system to «recognize» it to the other, 
ethics and esthetic education should be able to find their own space amongst 
the great debates on the reform of school systems, on parenthood, on family 
relationships etc.  All too often, the absence of a human metaphysics is to 
blame for the fact that education is not able to fulfil its true function as the 
handmaid of morality. However, each ought to be alienates the object in que-
stion from its love to be. In short, it perpetuates the modern fracture between 
bodies and ideas thus destroying much of the poietic character of educating 
because it places it at the level of an overarching morality which demands that 
all must follow a prescribed path.
IV. We have not yet succeeded in bringing beauty into ethics. For too 
long have we included the latter rather than both in the educational matrix. 
We consider education as something between art and science, the result of 
a predetermined moral system. The methods and materials of education are 
constructed through the lens of its objectives and consequently it is ruled by 
practical considerations so that, even when it acts on the most noble of in-
tentions, such as enquiring into what constitutes a «good life», precious little 
can be seen of the esthetics of the emotions, or of beauty. Support for this 
can be found in the fact that, in the face of a strenuous defence of ethics as 
the foundation of education, contemporary bourgeois society has adopted the 
practice of the ritualisation of art, an impulse that at one time was expressed 
in religious spirituality. The various forms of art perform an almost religious 
function becoming objects of devotion and reverence, even when they run 
counter to common sense; they legitimise an unexpressed need for transgres-
sion and exercise a compensatory function for those things which the modern 
world has destroyed. As Thomas Nipperdey puts it, moral education is the la-
bour of the working days, but art is «the spirit of Sundays»: the seats of culture 
14  Cfr. Pablo D’Ors, Biografia del silencio, Madrid, ediciones Siruela, 2014.
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– museums, art galleries, art spaces, individual or collective performances... 
– become the new «churches of esthetics»15.
Beauty, since Plato, has always been associated with Harmony, Proportion 
(see Timaeus and Filebo) and Radiance (see Phaedrus). Beauty is what is plea-
sing to the eye and can also be found in objects. As Umberto Eco points out, 
a beautiful object is something that, because of its form, satisfies the senses, 
particularly our eyes and ears. But it is not only those aspects perceptible to 
the senses that explain the beauty of the thing perceived; the qualities of the 
spirit and of character are more important in the case of the human being and 
come to be seen more with the eyes of the soul than those of the body16.
For the Ancients, beauty was always an objective quality. They located it 
in the object itself or in the natural qualities which made it beautiful. Nowa-
days, we believe that beauty may have two origins: the coming together of those 
material conditions which determine a perceived harmony between the parts 
(number, weight, shape, balance, claritas, integritas, proportio…) or the coming 
together of those moral conditions that make us seek beatitude beyond sensa-
tions, in something higher, in the clarity of ideas and/or in receiving God into 
our life, which are both the result of a critical and rational form of knowledge. 
To the Ancients, a work of art was a microcosm which reproduced in miniatu-
re the macrocosm, where the universal and substantial property of Beauty was 
located. The Moderns introduced the idea of the subjective, that is the ability 
of the individual to recognise the properties by virtue of which something may 
be called beautiful; whilst accepting that, if substantive properties of beauty do 
exist, it may not be possible to recognise them, making them beyond human 
comprehension. Finally, for the Contemporaries, the subjective is no longer so-
mething certain, but also a limitation, and this has opened the way to the relati-
vism of Taste and Beauty: we no longer accept the belief that goodness and be-
auty are realities rather than the result of our projections, and instead we believe 
that beauty is the form taken by the expression of our taste. Unlike our predeces-
sors, at least until the end of the Middle Ages, we are not shocked by any artistic 
precept or art form, not even the most conceptual or banally material, provided 
that there is somebody who advocates it and someone else who plays along. It is 
enough that there is an explanation from the artist, or someone claiming to be 
one, and sufficient external cues for us to recognise that we are faced with art or 
that we are in an artistic context (museums, galleries, exhibitions, art criticism). 
The contemporaries live in a state of constant artistic excitement which leads 
them no longer to consider the principles of art in objects, but only the move-
ment of things, discourses, sensations and emotions from the art-maker to the 
art spectator, who in this way takes part in the world of the arts.
15 Cfr. Th. Nipperdey, Come la borghesia ha inventato il moderno, Roma, Donzelli, 1994.
16  See U. Eco, Storia della bellezza, Milano, Bompiani, 2004; ID., On Beauty: a History of 
a Western Idea, Secker & Warburg, London 2010; D. Konstant, Beauty: the Fortune of an 
Ancient Greek Idea, New York Oxford, U. Press, 2014.
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V. The transformation of the ancient philosophy of beauty into a matter of 
taste led to the emergence, as Luc Ferry explains17, of three questions funda-
mental to the understanding of modern culture: the irrationality of beauty, the 
birth of art criticism – which called into question every artistic tradition – and 
the question of sensus communis and the interdisciplinary discourse around 
the subject of beauty. The problem of reconciling beauty with goodness (a sur-
plus of the ethical over the esthetic) was made even more complicated by the 
attempt of Thomas of Aquinas to formulate a clear anthropological synthesis. 
The great medieval philosopher asserted that «Beauty identifies itself with go-
odness but they are logically different»18 and declined to consider beauty as 
one of the «transcendentals» (unum, bonum, verum: the One, the Good and 
the True), something absolute in itself, preferring to think of it as something 
that completed them and required the involvement of man19. The theologian 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, author of a monumental work on the relationship 
between form and truth, describes to great effect the mediating character of 
Beauty and demonstrates that it is through «pulchrum that the glory of God’s 
bonum is bequeathed on man who recognises it as verum»20.
Looking back, we see that this problem had already arisen in the Aristo-
telian world-view which theorises that men are esthetic animals because they 
have the ability to learn and therefore they come to prefer that which gives 
them more satisfaction as they seek the greatest possible satisfaction in their 
endeavours. As Aristotle writes, «all men by nature desire to know»: they are 
born to learn. For Aristotle, who was the primary source of Scholasticism in 
the Middle Ages, education should not possess a specifically esthetic quality, 
but should encounter beauty as a support, as an introduction to goodness and 
moral freedom which are the true and only objectives of education21. 
Both the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian-Thomistic views overlooked so-
mething which is actually typically modern: self-expression as the exercise of 
freedom. Without beauty, no freedom is possible: the deprivation of beauty is 
directly proportional to the deprivation of freedom because no human being 
can be compelled to appreciate something or made to suffer with no reason 
or force himself to learn from others or to become something he does not 
want to be. The individual’s freedom to use his own body and ideas (freedom 
to be and freedom to think and communicate) has been the prerequisite for 
all education, particularly moral education, well before it was recognised as a 
fundamental human right. It follows that beauty is not merely a banal adjunct 
17  L. Ferry, Homo estheticus. L’invention du goût à l’age démocratique, Paris, LGV, 2008, pp. 
34-43.
18 Thomas of Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 27 a 1.
19  Cf. U. Eco, Il problema estetico in Tommaso d’Aquino, Milano, Bompiani, 1970.
20 H. U. von Balthasar, Gloria, I, La percezione della forma, G. Ruggieri (ed.), Milano, Jaka 
Book, 2012, p. 5.
21  U. Curi, L’apparire del bello. Nascita di un’idea, Milano, Bollati Boringhieri, 2013, pp. 33- 
34.
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or simply a way to approach goodness, but is part of the full meaning of the 
common good.
The protection of the environment, the search for harmony between man 
and creation and  between men, are not only critical to the survival of the 
human species, but also to the survival of freedom. It is a meeting of ideas 
which requires the rejection of any concept of educating which denies the pre-
education beauty of man, that is, his beauty before he was civilised, or which 
denies the possibility of beauty in ethics, whose model is not a perfect world 
(which can be smashed and shattered like a mirror), but the ever-changing 
world as we experience it. This is not about proclaiming the purity of nature 
or some banal concept of human innocence – something attempted repea-
tedly in Romantic ideology – but is to seek a consensus around the idea that 
everything which can be said is also inexpressible, and carries within itself an 
echo of the beauty of something that never corresponds to a formal model and 
can always be conceived and expressed in another way. 
VI. An esthetic pedagogy also has a valuable role in the “political” battle 
against attempts to divide mankind and place it in conflict with itself, reigni-
ting the myth of war or the sense of guilt simply for being alive. A new idea 
of esthetic pedagogy, therefore combats the gnostic idea that true beauty is a 
secret to be shared by a select few and which divides men between those who 
consume and those who do not consume art which is a falsification of life, in 
favour of  a new esthetic gnosis which supports  Western culture in developing 
a full esthetic sensibility  aimed at distinguishing  between  an age of artistic 
proliferation and full esthetic understanding. The true est-hetic mission of 
education is to recreate and preserve the value of concrete experience and of 
that feeling of being alive which is at the bottom of the question that life asks 
of itself. The great care that contemporary affluent societies take in order to 
«hide» – behind a purely utilitarian assessment of beauty –  the radical and 
“subversive” nature of life, is in itself evidence of a «prohibition on wonder» 
before the mundane and the imperfect character of our actions. Instead, faced 
with the estheticism of consumerism and technological or biological transhu-
manism, it is worthwhile remembering that all true progress requires a taste 
for risk and, above all, a defence of the principle of imperfection in human 
affairs on which history is founded.
A contemporary sceptical philosopher, Odo Marquard, considers the pro-
liferation of contemporary art, which insinuates itself into every aspect of life, 
as a choice determined by the need to compensate for the scarcity of pathos 
contained in our idea of experience, which is impoverished and disembodied, 
and which has lost its true nature in part also because of pedagogic schola-
sticism which presumes to replace real-life experience with descriptions and 
words, with a notion. In as much as we are suffering from a lack of patience, a 
“crisis of waiting” (Krise der Erwartung), from the human es-thetic perspec-
tive – and are now forced to deal with too many things and too many useless 
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ambitions – our way of interpreting a work of art, or more generally, the re-
ality in which we are immersed, no longer meets the human need for love or 
the need to understand something, to make it become part of us. Living as 
art or living as if everything were art, becomes a superficial compensation, 
even in an obsessive form, for the loss of the impact of real experience and 
for the impossibility of really putting ourselves to the test22. The horizons of 
our expectations contract and, with this loss of intensity, so does our capacity 
to become adults and to strengthen ourselves. Marquard observes that the 
arts play, on the one hand, a positive role in the expectation of reality, but on 
the other  they substitute for it and place it somewhere between wonder and 
disenchantment; It is a way of becoming adult without actually experiencing 
it directly, a remedy against estrangement from the world. If the «prohibition 
on wonder» and on suffering for our failure to comprehend is not lifted, and if 
esthetics does not return to a loving tension with ethics, with est-hetics, there 
is the risk that art, like politics or economics, will become the executioner of 
empathy and of all ethics based on an understanding of human morphology.
22  O. Marquard,  Antropologia ed estetica,  Roma, Armando, 2007, p. 120. 
